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RECENT CASES
LIQUOR LAW LIABILITY-COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-DRUNK BAR PATRON DENIED RECOVERY
FOR HIS INJURIES IN A SUIT AGAINST THE BAR-Kindt
v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976).
Helmut Fred Kindt, the customer of a bar, sued the bar
owner for damages which Kindt sustained in an automobile
accident caused by his intoxication. Kindt alleged that the bar
owner negligently sold him alcoholic beverages while he was
obviously intoxicated in violation of Business and Professions
Code section 25602.2 The trial court sustained the bar owner's
general demurrer and a judgment of dismissal was entered.3
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment
of the trial court, basing its holding on three California cases
which, the court stated, clearly enunciated the established decisional law applicable to the pleadings under attack at the
hearing on demurrer.4 These cases, when taken together, stand
for the proposition that a claim against a bar owner for a bar
patron's own injury or death resulting from his voluntary intoxication will be denied on the ground that he is contributorily
negligent as a matter of law.5
1. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 847, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 604 (1976).
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964) provides: "Every person who
sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic
beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person
is guilty of a misdemeanor."
3. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 847, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
4. Id. at 861, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
5. See Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Carlisle v. Kanaywer,
24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1972); Sargent v. Goldberg, 25 Cal. App. 3d
940, 102 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1972) (by implication). In Cole, a wrongful death action, the
surviving wife and minor children of the deceased sought to recover damages against
the defendant tavern owner for the allegedly negligent furnishing of intoxicating liquor
to the deceased which, it was claimed, proximately caused his death. The facts indicated that Bernard Cole was a regular patron of defendant's bar; that defendant knew
he was normally of quiet demeanor but, when intoxicated, he became "belligerent,
pugnacious and quarrelsome"; that nevertheless defendant sold him enough alcohol
to allow him to become intoxicated; that, as a result he became belligerent, pugnacious and quarrelsome and engaged in a brawl with another patron during the course
of which he fell to the concrete floor, receiving a fatal blow to his head. 45 Cal. 2d at
347-48, 289 P.2d at 451. The court held, inter alia, that Cole's voluntary consumption
of intoxicating liquor contributed directly to his injuries and that this constituted
contributory negligence which barred recovery by his heirs. Id. at 356, 289 P.2d at 457.
In Carlisle, also a wrongful death action, the defendant's liability was denied when
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To begin its analysis the court cited Vesely v. Sager,' a
California Supreme Court case of pivotal significance in the
development of the law governing a liquor vendor's civil
liability. Vesely partially abrogated the common law rule of
non-liability of a purveyor of alcoholic beverages for injuries
caused by intoxicated patrons It held that a bar owner who
violates Business and Professions Code section 25602 is prehe served the intoxicated decedent in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25602, and decedent became ill and died in the bar when he strangled, inhaling
his own vomit. The court held: "If the concurrent negligence of the plaintiff is a
proximate contributing cause of his injury, his own recovery is barred by his contributory negligence." 24 Cal. App. 3d at 591, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
In Sargent, plaintiff, a customer of defendant's liquor store, allegedly approaching
a state of drunkenness, made a purchase and immediately thereafter entered a restaurant where he met his death when he struck his head on the ground while being evicted
by the restaurant owner. The court, in denying recovery to the plaintiff, based its
decision on the fact that the decedent was only approaching a state of drunkenness
and that there was no allegation that decedent was "obviously intoxicated" or a
"habitual or common drunkard," so as to trigger a violation of Business and Professions Code section 25602, or that the purchase proximately caused the customer's
death. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 943-44, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 302. In affirming the trial court's
decision to sustain the demurrer of defendant liquor store without leave to amend, the
Sargent court, citing Cole v. Rush and Carlisle v. Kanaywer, concluded that it could
"conceive of no way plaintiff could amend her complaint to establish a violation of
section 25602 that would not also establish contributory negligence of the decedent."
Id. at 944, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
6. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
7. At common law it was not a tort to furnish intoxicating liquor to an ablebodied adult. In the absence of a statute, there was no cause of action against the
purveyor of alcoholic beverages in favor of third party plaintiffs injured by the person
to whom such beverages were furnished. 45 AM. JuR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553
(1969). A recovery for injuries caused by intoxication was only possible from the individual consumer. Further, if the vendee was the plaintiff, the vendor could invoke the
defense of contributory negligence.
The rationale for the common law rule of non-liability was that consumption,
rather than the sale, of liquor was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained as a
result of intoxication. See Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 356, 289 P.2d 450, 457 (1955);
Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 809, 143 P.2d 952, 955 (1943); Pratt v. Daly, 55
Ariz. 535, 538, 104 P.2d 147, 148 (1940).
Vesely rejected the common law view of proximate cause as it applied to its facts.
The court found that furnishing an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person may
be a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by that individual on a third person. Such
furnishing is a proximate cause "because the consumption, resulting intoxication, and
injury-producing conduct are foreseeable intervening causes, or at least the injuryproducing conduct is one of the hazards which makes such furnishing negligent." 5 Cal.
3d at 164, 486 P. 2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 447, 449 (1965).
In many states the common law rule has been substantially abrogated by statutes
which specifically impose civil liability upon a purveyor of intoxicating beverages
under certain circumstances. See Keenan, LiquorLaw Liability in California,14 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 46 (1973); Comment, Dramshop Liability-A JudicialResponse, 57 CALIF.
L. REV. 995, 996 & n.6 (1969) (listing 20 states that have such statutes).
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sumptively negligent' and that a duty of care runs from the
owner in favor of third persons who are injured by the intoxicated patron.' The Vesely court expressly refrained from deciding the precise issue before the court in Kindt-i.e., whether
the person who is served alcoholic beverages in violation of a
statute may recover for his own injuries suffered as a result of
that violation.1°
Since Vesely, three California appellate cases have confronted this question, ultimately denying the drunken patron
compensation for his own injuries." Two of the cases, Carlisle
v. Kanaywer12 and Sargent v. Goldberg,31 held that a complaint
alleging the intoxication of the plaintiff or plaintiff's decedent
showed contributory negligence on its face and was therefore
subject to a general demurrer. 4 A third case, Cooper v. National RailroadPassengerCorp.,' 5 held that a drunken patron's
cause of action is barred "by his voluntary assumption of the
known and conspicuous risks incident to the consumption of
alcoholic beverages in bars."'8 The foregoing cases reflect the
8. 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32. In California, a
presumption of negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was enacted to
protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm
sustained as a result of a defendant's prohibited conduct. See Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal.
2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958); Satterlee v. Orange Glen School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177
P.2d 279 (1947); CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a) (West Supp. 1976).
9. 5 Cal. 3d at 164-65, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
10. Id. at 157, 486 P.2d at 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625. In 1972, the California
legislature deleted an amendment to Assembly Bill No. 1864 which sought to codify
and extend the scope of Vesely to include the drunken patron within the scheme of
compensability. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 851, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 607. The
Kindt court cited this negative act of the legislature as authority for the existence of a
legislative intent to deny to an intoxicated patron recovery for injuries proximately
resulting from a violation of Business and Professions Code section 25602. Id. at 851,
859, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 607, 612. The weight accorded this inference of intent by the
Kindt court, however, becomes significantly diminished with the recognition that a
court can have no means of knowing the reasons which influenced the legislature in
rejecting an amendment. See 73 AM. JUa. 2d Statutes § 171 (1974). Any number of
reasons other than the one advanced by the Kindt court might have prompted this
deletion. Reference to such negative action, therefore, although some authority for the
court's conclusions, is only secondary authority at best.
11. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 849-50, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
12. 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1972); see note 5 supra for a discussion of Carlisle.
13. 25 Cal. App. 3d 940, 102 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1972) (by implication); see note 5
supra for a discussion of Sargent.
14. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 850, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 606; see note 5
supra.
15. 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 119 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1975).
16. Id. at 393, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 544 (citations omitted). The court's preference
for viewing the drinker's ccnduct as a voluntary assumption of the risk was a conscious
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law as it existed in 1975 when the California Supreme Court
in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,17 enunciated a system of comparative

negligence. The Kindt court determined that if Li did not alter
the judicially well-settled law denying a remedy to the injured
drunken patron against the bar owner, the plaintiff would be
unable to recover. His contributory negligence in voluntarily
becoming intoxicated would bar his recovery for negligence
against the bar owner."
The court then considered the impact of Li v. Yellow Cab
Co.'9 on the instant controversy. After an exhaustive discussion
of the effect of the Li decision, the court reached the same
result-i.e., Kindt could not recover. His inability to recover
under Li was based on two grounds: the limited retroactivity
given the comparative negligence doctrine by the Li court and
avoidance of the question of the viability of the traditional doctrine of contributory
negligence, which question was then before the California Supreme Court in Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). Cooper v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d at 394 n.2, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 544 n.2
(1975).
Two additional grounds for its result were indicated by the Cooper court. First,
the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than their serving, is the proximate
cause of any injury to the drinker as a result of his own intoxication. Second, since
both the patron and the bartender are violating the criminal law, the bartender, by
serving liquor to an obviously intoxicated patron in violation of Business and Professions Code section 25602, and the patron, by being drunk in a public place in violation
of Penal Code section 647(f), they are in pari delicto, or equal fault. The law, under
these circumstances, usually leaves the parties in the condition in which it finds them.
Id. at 393-94, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
17. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
18. See cases cited at note 5 supra. Several jurisdictions, although a minority,
have permitted recovery to an intoxicated plaintiff on the ground that contributory
negligence is no defense to a claim by a person whom a statute was designed to protect
against his own inability to exercise self-protective care. Vance v. United States, 355
F. Supp. 756 (D. Alas. 1973); Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d
630 (1966); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958). California
Business and Professions Code section 25602 is similar to the Pennsylvania statute
used in Schelin, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (Purdon 1969); the New Jersey regula-

tion in Soronen, Regulation 20, Rule 1, adopted pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-39
(West 1940); and the Alaska statute used in Vance, ALASKA STAT. § 04.15.020(a).
In light of the Kindt court's finding that an intoxicated patron is a member of the
class for whose protection Business and Professions Code section 25602 was enacted,
it can be argued that that statute was intended to protect the intoxicated patron from
the hazards of his own consumption and the defendant bar owner should bear the
entire responsibility for the harm which has occurred. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 483, Comment c, at 539 (1965).
Now, under comparative negligence, however, the all-or-nothing problem is eliminated and it would seem appropriate to reconsider the above argument in light of the
principles of shared responsibility. The plaintiff's recovery should now be diminished
in proportion to his own negligence in bringing about his injuries. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
19. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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the Kindt court's conclusion that principles of comparative
negligence should not apply to situations involving willful misconduct.
The Li decision was limited by the California Supreme
Court to apply only to those cases in which "trial" began after
the date the opinion was filed.20 In the present case, the
defendant's demurrer was sustained without leave to amend in
May 1974, and a judgment of dismissal was entered September
1974.21 The decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. became final on
March 31, 1975.2 Since the court in Kindt resolved that a
"trial" within the meaning of Li had taken place when a general demurrer to a complaint is sustained without leave to
amend and a judgment is entered,2 it is evident that the Li
decision could have no application.
Despite its holding on procedural grounds that Li v. Yellow
Cab Co. was inapplicable to the case before it, the Kindt court
nevertheless analyzed its potential impact. The court concluded that, even if Li were to apply to the instant controversy,
the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover.24 In reaching this
conclusion the court addressed itself to two issues. First, is the
20. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
21. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 860, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
22. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858.
23. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 861-62, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14. In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on a host of California Supreme Court cases in which "trial" was
variously defined. Principal among these decisions is O'Day v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.
2d 540, 116 P.2d 621 (1941), in which the court defined trial as including "all rulings
of a court in proceedings before it made in furtherance of the decisions made upon the
issues in the case which form the basis of the judgment." Id. at 544, 116 P.2d at 624
(citations omitted). In Berri v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 856, 279 P.2d 8 (1955), the
court stated, "When the demurrer has been sustained and judgment of dismissal has
been entered, there has been a trial and the action is not subject to dismissal under
section 583. . . . [It] has been said generally in defining a trial that it is the determination of an issue of law or fact; a demurrer of course calls for the determination of an
issue of law only." Id. at 859, 279 P.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Finally, in McDonough Power Equip. Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 527, 503 P.2d
1338, 105 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1972), the court stated, "[Iln defining 'trial' we have said
'that it is the determination of an issue of law or fact' or 'the examination . . . of the
facts or law put in issue in a cause .
' Id. at 531, 503 P.2d at 1341, 105 Cal. Rptr.
at 333 (citations omitted).
Judge Friedman, the lone dissenter in Kindt, sought to discern the meaning of the
word "trial" solely with regard to the individualized purpose of the Li court's
declaration of limited retroactivity. Inasmuch as the utterance in the Li opinion on this
issue is typically cryptic, and in view of the rather clear precedent defining "trial" to
include the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, Judge Friedman's reliance on his reading of Li seems misplaced. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 864-65, 129 Cal. Rptr.
at 616.
24. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 860, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
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drunken patron guilty of willful misconduct? Second, if the

first question is' answered in the affirmative, should the Li
decision be extended to add a comparative willful misconduct
doctrine to comparative negligence?25
In addressing itself to the first question, the court noted
that the doctrine of comparative negligence, which abrogated
the common law defense of contributory negligence, calls for
the diminution of a plaintiff's recovery in proportion to his
own negligence." The application of this doctrine by the Kindt
court may have resulted in a recovery by the plaintiff, reduced
only by his own proportionate share of negligence. To avoid this
result, the Kindt court found both the plaintiff-patron and
defendant-bar-owner guilty not of mere negligence, but of willful misconduct. 7 The court reasoned:
Nothing is more elementary than that a person normally
becomes intoxicated as a result of his own volition ...
[T]he drunken patron in reality commits a crime as he
sits upon the bar stool. Before imbibing at all, he is fully
aware of the debilitating effects of alcohol upon the senses,
and of its total effect upon himself. He knows that if he
consumes it to excess, his subsequent activities may render
him a danger and a menace to himself and others, especially innocent third persons. Yet, despite this prior knowledge, he inexcusably proceeds to consume alcohol in sufficient quantities to bring about the predicted result. This
is willful and wanton misconduct as clear as any imaginable.28
25. Id. at 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
26. Id. at 851, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 607; see Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,
828-29, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975).
27. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 852 & n.1, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608 & n.1. "Willful misconduct

means intentional wrongful conduct, done either with knowledge that serious injury
...
will result or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results ....
Reuther v. Viall, 62 Cal. 2d 470, 475, 398 P.2d 792, 795, 42 Cal. Rptr. 456, 459 (1965);
see Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 118 P.2d 465 (1941); BAJI No. 3.52
(1971 re-revision). No other California court, on these or similar facts, has so characterized the wrongful conduct of either a patron who drinks to intoxication or of a bar
owner who serves such patron in violation of Business and Professions Code section
25602. Formerly, such conduct was labelled negligent. See, e.g., Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.
3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971); Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d
450 (1955). But see Cooper v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 119
Cal. Rptr. 541 (1975). Noting that prior to Li, California cases denying plaintiff recovery spoke in terms of negligence, the Kindt court suggested that there was no need to
"delve deeper" into the finer distinctions between negligence, willful misconduct or
intentional wrongdoing on the part of the plaintiff. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 860, 129 Cal.
Rptr. at 613. At that time mere negligence was sufficient to bar his recovery.
28. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The Kindt court expressly
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Having declared the plaintiff guilty of willful misconduct,
the court then raised a question of first impression in California. Should Li now be extended to add a comparative willful
misconduct doctrine to comparative negligence?"
Prior to Li while a plaintiffs contributory negligence did
not bar his cause of action against a defendant guilty of willful
misconduct, his contributory willful misconduct was a complete bar thereto. 0 However, the court noted that it did not
follow from the Li decision that, because we now have comparative negligence, we also have comparative willful misconduct.3 1 The court decided that this question turns upon
whether a duty of care exists in favor of a willful wrongdoer. 2
excluded minors and alcoholics from the scope of its opinion, limiting its discussion to
adult plaintiffs who intentionally become intoxicated. Id. at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
29. Id. at 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
30. Cawog v. Rothbaum, 165 Cal. App. 2d 577, 591, 331 P.2d 1063, 1071 (1958);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 482 (1965).
31. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The supreme court in Li
declined to address itself to this question. It did, however, briefly articulate arguments
advanced both for and against extension of the doctrine of comparative negligence to
the area of willful misconduct. On the one hand, the court suggested that, since the
difference between willful misconduct and negligence is thought to be one of kind
rather than degree, comparative negligence concept should not be applied. Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 825, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 873 (1975). On
the other hand, the court observed that "a comprehensive system of comparative
negligence should allow for the apportionment of damages in all cases involving misconduct short of being intentional." Id. at 825-26, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
873, citing V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.3 (1974). Presumably the Kindt
court was more persuaded by the former argument since it was the only one it mentioned in its opinion. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 607. This distinction
between willful misconduct and negligence, although of some moment, was not controlling in the court's resolution of the foregoing question.
32. Such an assertion, however, begs the essential question. Although the existence of a duty is a sine qua non to a finding of liability on the part of a defendant and
therefore to the application of a system of comparative fault, it does not in itself call
for the establishment of comparative willful misconduct. The propriety of such a
system must be determined from the interpretation of the policies and principles set
forth in the Li opinion.
It is difficult to imagine that the court meant to say that which is the clear import
of its language. Presumably the court meant that, before it would consider the relative
merits of a system of comparative willful misconduct, the existence of the defendant's
duty should first be determined. If the defendant's duty is affirmed, the court would
be squarely presented with the question of extending the doctrine of comparative
negligence to willful misconduct. If denied, the entire question is rendered moot and
the court need not address it. The Kindt court, after an involved duty analysis, denied
defendant's duty, thereby truncating its own inquiry by avoiding the real question it
raised.
On the other hand, the court may have in fact meant precisely what it said-i.e.,
that a finding of duty in favor of the plaintiff-willful-wrongdoer ipso facto requires
application of the comparative negligence doctrine to willful misconduct. Under this
reading of the opinion, an affirmation of defendant's duty would likely result in a
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The existence of a duty in California can be arrived at in
essentially one of two ways. The first is by application of the
doctrine of negligence per se and its recent codification in Evidence Code section 669(a).13 Under this doctrine, a defendant's
conduct is presumed negligent if it violates a statute designed
to protect persons against the type of harm caused by the defendant's prohibited conduct. 4 In arriving at the existence of
a duty under this approach, a court, in effect, lifts from the
legislature its particularized formulation of the duty of care as
embodied in the statute and adopts it as its own. The Kindt
court, citing Vesely, found that section 25602 was designed to
protect "members of the general public from injuries . . . resulting from the excessive use of intoxicating liquor, ,35 and that

the plaintiff, as a patron of defendant's bar, was one of the
members of the general public for whose protection section
25602 was enacted.3 The court next reasoned that such a finding does not ipso facto generate the duty essential for civil
liability, since the courts are the final arbiters of the civil scope
of a penal statute such as section 25602. 3' It determined that,
in this case, the existence of a criminal statute prohibiting a
bar owner from serving liquor to an obviously intoxicated parecovery to the plaintiff reduced by an amount equal to his percentage of fault. See
note 26 and accompanying text supra. The possibility of such a result might well have
been the impetus behind the Kindt court's denial of the requisite duty to the drunken
plaintiff. Indeed, the foregoing supposition renders significantly more comprehensible
the court's duty analysis.
33. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a) (West Supp. 1976) provides:
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance or regulation of a public
entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or
property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurence of the nature
which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or
property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the
statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.
34. See Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279
(1947); W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 201 (4th ed. 1971).
35. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
23001 (West 1964).
36. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 853, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608. In so doing the court overruled
dicta in Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 808, 143 P.2d 952, 954 (1943), which
stated that an obviously intoxicated patron is not a member of the class for whose
benefit the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act was enacted. (The Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act currently appears at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23000 et seq. (West 1964).)
37. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 854, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
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tron is not conclusive evidence of a duty of care but merely one
element in the court's analysis."8
The second method of determining the existence and scope
of a duty is by employment of the more common tort mechanisms of balancing social interests and policies. This often includes an accounting of a statutory prohibition of the defendant's conduct, but, as already indicated, such a prohibition
is not conclusive. The Kindt court, exercising its judicial prerogative, adopted this latter approach in its duty analysis."
Whether a duty of care exists in favor of a particular plaintiff initially depends on the court's determination of the reasonable foreseeability of the harm which he, in fact, suffered."0
In the case at bar, the court readily found the plaintiff's injuries to be reasonably foreseeable.' The duty inquiry, however,
does not stop there. The concept of duty encompasses an intricate web of social policy considerations as broad as the entire
law of negligence. Prosser noted that "'duty' is not sacrosanct
in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection.'4 2 The Kindt court synthesized into administrative, moral, and socioeconomic categories
the policy considerations which it believed to be most significant in the determination of a duty of care and, through it, the
extent of protection afforded the plaintiff.
Although the court found the administrative considerations to be weighted against the plaintiff, it nevertheless indi38. Id.
39. Quoting from Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d
1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (1963), the court summarized the policy factors underlying
a duty-Pf care:
"The social utility of the activity out of which the injury arises, compared
with the risks involved in its conduct; the kind of person with whom the
actor is dealing; the workability of a rule of care, especially in terms of
the parties' relative ability to adopt practical means of preventing injury;
the relative ability of the parties to bear the financial burden of injury
and the availability of means by which the loss may be shifted or spread;
the body of statutes and judicial precedents which color the parties'
relationship; the prophylactic effect of a rule of liability; . . . and finally,
the moral imperatives which judges share with their fellow citizens-such
are the factors which play a role in the determination of duty. '
57 Cal. App. 3d at 854, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
40. Wierum v. RKO Gen. Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr.
468, 471 (1975); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739-41, 441 P.2d 912, 919-20, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 79-80 (1968).
41. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 854, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
42.

W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 325-26 (4th ed. 1971).
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cated that this finding was not the impetus behind its denial
of recovery to the drunken patron.43 It was the moral and socioeconomic factors which ultimately moved the court to conclude "that the requisite duty of the tavern owner to the drunken patron does not exist, that the comparative negligence doctrine of Li does not apply to willful misconduct, and that the
Vesely v. Sager rule does not extend to injuries to the drunken
patron himself.""
The court placed a great deal of emphasis on the moral
blameworthiness of the intoxicated plaintiff. It found that the
self-indulgent act of voluntary intoxication is of such reprehensible character that one engaging in such conduct ought to be
held singularly responsible for his own resulting injuries. This
is so, regardless of his being provided the intoxicating liquor in
violation of section 25602. To allow monetary recovery to a
plaintiff would not only be an improper exercise of governmental paternalism which would encourage individual irresponsibility, but would, according to the court, be "morally indefensible.""
The court seemed uncomfortable facing what it considered
to be the practical problem of "favoring,"on the one hand, the
drunken patron and, on the other, the tavern owner, guilty of
violating a penal statute, neither of whom was completely innocent. Purporting not to concede a favor to either one, the court
invoked the doctrine of in pari delicto6 which compelled a
denial of recovery to the plaintiff.'
Finally, the court analyzed the socioeconomic considerations underlying a duty of care, finding that they also militate
against allowing recovery to the plaintiff. Noting the high in43.
44.
45.

57 Cal. App. 3d at 855, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
Id. at 855, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
Id. at 856, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 610.

46.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1324 (3d ed. 1944), defines in pari delicto as follows:

In equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilty or in legal fault. See 42
C.J.S. 490 (1944).
47. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 856, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 610. It might well be argued that
the application of a comparative fault principle in this case would not actually "favor"
the plaintiff-patron but would merely provide a more equitable allocation of the loss
in proportion to the respective fault of the parties. The court considered and rejected
this argument, reasoning that, since heretofore such a plaintiff would be denied any
recovery under the now-rejected doctrine of contributory negligence, to grant any
recovery would amount to a "pure and simple financial windfall to an undeserving
plaintiff." Id. at 857, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 611. While this temporal comparison of plaintiff's relative posture prior to and after the establishment of comparative negligence
does, in fact, indicate a benefit bestowed upon him, this was the very result intended
by the adoption of comparative negligence in California.
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cidence of automobile accidents caused by drunk drivers who
patronize these establishments, 8 the court sought to fashion a
rule which would serve as an effective deterrent to this serious
problem. The rule which emerged from the court's deterrent
theory called for the denial of a bar owner's duty to the intoxicated patron.
Two assumptions, pertaining to the effect of a contrary
rule, underly the court's rationale. The first is that a rule granting recovery to the plaintiff would inevitably result in the
encouragement of excessive alcohol consumption by the patron, as well as the relaxation of his personal efforts toward selfprotection care. The second assumption is that such a rule (i.e.,
granting recovery) would provide "no converse prophylactic
effect on society in terms of a deterrent to a tavern owner." 9
The court was convinced that the evils wrought by a rule of
civil liability outweighed any salutary effects by way of deterrence which might result from it.
Judge Friedman, dissenting, departed from the majority
on several issues, most significant of which are: (1) the characterization of plaintiff's behavior as willful misconduct, and
(2) the analysis of the moral and socioeconomic factors underlying the court's denial of defendant's duty of care.
Speaking to the issue of willful misconduct, the dissent
concluded that "the majority approach rests on a usurpation
of the jury function."' Willful misconduct is normally a ques48. Id. at 858, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 611. A recent California statistical report found
that "over 40% of all fatal accidents showed the party causing the accident ...
had
been drinking." Id. at 871 n.7, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 620 n.7, citing CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY
PATROL,

1974

ANNUAL REPORT OF FATAL AND INJURY MOTOR VEHIcLE AcCIDENTS

57.

49. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 858, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
50. Id. at 866, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 617. In light of the poverty of facts provided in
the opinion, it would appear that by its finding the Kindt court has painted with too
broad a brush. Essentially, the court has determined that, in every instance when an
ordinary able-bodied adult voluntarily consumes alcohol to the point of intoxication,
he is guilty of willful misconduct as a matter of law. Id. at 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
Similarly, the court found that whenever a tavern owner or his bartender violates
Business and Professions Code section 25602, he is also guilty of willful misconduct.
Id. at 852 n.1, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608 n.1. Since willful misconduct normally depends
on the facts of a particular case (Studer v. Plough, 179 Cal. App. 2d 436, 440-41, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 785, 789 (1960); see 35 CAL. JUR. 2D, Negligence § 201 (1957)), the court, by its
over-broad pronouncement, has indeed usurped the jury function. It simply cannot be
said that, in all of the varied factual settings encompassed by the court's ruling,
reasonable jurors could not differ in finding both a plaintiff-patron and a defendantbar-owner guilty of willful misconduct. As has been shown, the consequences of so
characterizing the conduct of the parties will often operate very harshly on the barpatron-plaintiff.
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tion of fact to be decided not by the court, but by the jury.'
The dissent noted that no authority was cited by the majority
in support of its finding of willful misconduct.
The second major point of departure for Judge Friedman
was his application of the doctrine of comparative negligence
to the policy factors used to formulate a duty of care. He recognized that a system of comparative fault rearranges the pro and
con factors in a duty analysis, resulting in a shift of emphasis
to concepts of "split liability" or "shared loss."52
In his discussion of the moral factor, the dissent noted that
the now defunct contributory negligence defense did not "'rest
upon the idea that the defendant was relieved of any duty
toward the plaintiff' ,,13 but, rather, that although the defendant breached his duty, the plaintiff's recovery was barred by
his own conduct. A court's investigation of a particular defendant's duty assigned little significance to the moral blame of
the plaintiff. Under comparative negligence, a plaintiff's negligence does not bar his recovery but permits the jury to reduce
his recovery in proportion to his own fault. The dissent suggested that the possibility of a plaintiff's recovery will encounter "expectable judicial-moral resistance." 4 Formerly, when
contributory negligence was a complete defense, a court could
satisfy its moral disapprobation of a drunken plaintiff by
charging him with contributory negligence "as a matter of
law." However, this "judicial escape route" is no longer available. Now, in order to achieve the same result, a court must
attribute controlling significance to the plaintiff's moral
blameworthiness in its duty analysis.
Judge Friedman maintained that to take into account the
moral blame of the defendant in assessing his liability, would
be "giving attention to that which is no real part of the law." 5
Strongly criticizing the majority for injecting into the duty
analysis its own subjective moral disapproval of the intoxicated
patron, he urged the application of a moral standard set, not
by the personal predilections of the individual judges, but by
the generally held ethical expectations of society as a whole.5
51.- 57 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
52. Id. at 867, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
53. Id. at 868, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 618 (citation omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 869, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 619, citing Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as
Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. Rv. 586 (1933).
56. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 869, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 619. This judicial tendency of
accounting for a party's moral blameworthiness in determining his liability is indeed
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These ethical expectations find expression in the normative concept of duty which embodies two "equally forceful"
demands: "(1) that each assume responsibility for his own
safety, and (2) that each assume responsibility for the safety
of others." 5 7
Recognizing that the simultaneous fulfillment of these
dual aims is rarely achieved, the dissent explained that comparative negligence places these moral forces in approximate
equilibrium, thereby striking an equitable compromise.58 Comparative negligence recognizes that it is often the case that both
plaintiff and defendant are morally culpable. Therefore, the
goal of equilibrium can be reached only by forcing both culpable parties to share the loss. The dissent criticized the majority
for destroying this equilibrium by utilizing a duty formulation
which denounces the plaintiff's disregard for his own safety
while insulating the defendant from responsibility for others.
To assert the moral blame of the plaintiff as the reason for rejecting the defendant's duty completely prevents application of
the concept of shared responsibility. The negation of duty when
both parties are morally blameworthy only shields the irresponsible liquor vendor. The majority emphasized the moral
blame of the intoxicated patron and denigrated that of the
tavern owner, while the dissent, finding both parties culpable,
focused on the strong legislative disapprobation of liquor sellers
who reap profits by selling to intoxicated customers in violation
of Business and Professions Code section 25602.58 The foregoing
analysis of the moral factor led the dissent to the conclusion
that "the moral pros and cons are at a dead heat."' "
Similarly, the dissenting judge's analysis of the socioeconomic factor refutes the majority position. The majority did not
envision any salutary deterrent effect resulting from a rule
which holds the tavern owner liable for a drunken patron's
injuries, whereas the dissent theorized that the prospect of a
civil damage action against the tavern owner would diminish
the indiscriminate flow of drinks by encouraging him to maintain stricter control over the dispensation of alcoholic beverpervasive. As such, it is one with which lawyers must deal as a practical matter.
Recognition of its existence will materially enhance the predictability of a particular
judicial result.
57. Id. at 869, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 619; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463,
Comment b (1965).
58. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 869, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 619.

59.
60.

Id. at 871, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
Id.
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ages in his establishment.' For this reason, and because effective control of liquor dispensing establishments through criminal and licensing sanctions, such as section 25602, is virtually
impossible, the dissent strongly urged the affirmation of the
duty. "
The majority correctly observed that such a rule of liability will undoubtedly result in higher liability insurance premiums to tavern owners, the cost of which will be passed on to
the consuming public in the form of increased liquor prices. 3
This result is not, however, as inexpedient as it might appear
at first blush. The dissent indicated that by carrying insurance,
a bar owner is in a better position to bear the financial burden
of the injury and spread or shift the loss to the public at large.
Further, in a system of comparative fault, the loss will almost
always be shared because of the frequency of contributory fault
in this kind of case. Since the plaintiff will bear a proportion
of his damages, recovery and settlement averages will be low
relative to other types of enterprise damage payments. 4
The reasoning employed and the conclusions drawn by the
Kindt court in its duty analysis reveal a predisposition to denying the plaintiff a remedy. This fact casts doubt on the court's
ruling on both the "trial" issue 5 and the characterization of the
parties' behavior as willful misconduct. Judge Friedman, dissenting, maintained a greater degree of objectivity in his approach and exhibited a more profound appreciation of the impact of comparative negligence on the factors comprising a
61. Id. at 873-74, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 622. Themajority also assumed that granting
plaintiff recovery would encourage patrons to drink to excess and otherwise relax their
personal efforts toward self-protective care. Although not specifically addressed by
the dissent, this assumption is of dubious validity. To be encouraged toward a particular mode of behavior by a rule of law, a person, first, must be aware of the rule and,
second, must act in reliance on it. The court's assumption envisions such a wellinformed, rational patron who knows the law and considers the probable legal consequences of his behavior. Does this characterization of a typical bar patron comport
with reality? If not, the persuasiveness of the court's rationale is seriously diminished.
A bar owner, on the other hand, is much more likely to be aware of his potential
criminal and civil liabilities since they are well-known risks of doing business. Consequently, the tavern owner is much more likely to be affected by a rule of liability than
the patron would be by a rule of non-liability. It would follow logically that, if there is
to be a prophylactic effect on society by way of deterrence, it is best achieved by a
rule which allows plaintiff's cause of action.
62. Id. at 873-74, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
63. Id. at 859, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
64. Id. at 874 & n.ll, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 622 & n.ll.
65. Id. at 860-62, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14.
66. Id. at 852, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
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duty. Unfortunately, the court's concern with the outcome of
the case resulted in harsh consequences for the injured plaintiff.
Thomas L. Hanavan

DUE PROCESS-POLICEMEN'S HAIR LENGTH REGULATION DOES NOT INFRINGE UPON ANY RIGHTS
GUARANTEED MEMBERS OF A UNIFORMED CIVILIAN
SERVICE BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-Kelley
v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
In 1971, respondent's predecessor,' individually and as
president of New York's Suffolk County Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, brought an action under the Civil Rights Act
of 18712 against the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police
Department, seeking to invalidate certain hair grooming regulations3 as violative of patrolmen's first and fourteenth amend1. Dwen v. Barry, 336 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), is the parent case to Kelley.
The names were subsequently changed as different individuals filled the positions of
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association President and Commissioner of Police.
2. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Entitled Civil Action for
Deprivation of Rights, section 1983 is often used in conjunction with a due process
argument to have a case tried in a federal court. The case at bar is exemplary; plaintiff
alleged that the regulation deprived him of his basic constitutional rights under color
of state law. See Comment, Long Hairand the Law: A Look at Constitutionaland Title
VII Challenges to Public and Private Regulation of Male Grooming, 24 KAN. L. REV.
143 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Long Hair and the Law].
3. The hair grooming regulations under scrutiny were contained in Order No. 711, effective August 1, 1971:
2/75.0 Members of the Force and Department shall be neat and clean at
all times while on duty. Male personnel shall comply with the following
grooming standards unless excluded by the Police Commissioner due to
special assignment:
2/75.1 HAIR: Hair shall be neat, clean, trimmed, and present a groomed
appearance. Hair will not touch the ears or the collar except the closely
cut hair on the back of the neck. Hair in front will be groomed so that it
does not fall below the band of properly worn headgear. In no case will
the bulk or length of the hair interfere with the proper wear of any authorized headgear. The acceptability of a member's hair style will be based
upon the criteria in this paragraph and not upon the style in which he
chooses to wear his hair.
2/75.2 SIDEBURNS: If an individual chooses to wear sideburns, they will
be neatly trimmed and tapered in the same manner as his haircut. Sideburns will not extend below the lowest part of the exterior ear opening,
will be of even width (not flared), and will end with a cleanshaven horizontal line.
2/75.3 MUSTACHES: A short and neatly trimmed mustache may be
worn, but shall not extend over the top of the upper lip or beyond the
corners of the mouth.
2/75.4 BEARDS & GOATEES: The face will be clean-shaven other than
the wearing of the acceptable mustache or sideburns. Beards and goatees
are prohibited, except that a Police Surgeon may grant a waiver for the
wearing of a beard for medical reasons with the approval of the Police
Commissioner. When a Surgeon prescribes that a member not shave, the
beard will be kept trimmed symmetrically and all beard hairs will be kept
trimmed so that they do not protrude more than one-half inch from the
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ment rights.4
Under the department's standards, beards and goatees
were forbidden, sideburns could not extend below the lowest
part of the exterior ear opening, and mustaches had to be short
and neatly trimmed.5 Respondent objected to this order on the
grounds that, since the general community standards were less
restrictive, compliance with the order would set him apart from
the community in violation of his first amendment right of free
expression and fourteenth amendment rights to due process
and equal protection of the law. 6
Respondent's attack on the validity of the regulation was
dismissed by the district court. Although the district court recognized that application of the regulation to non-uniformed
police could constitute an infringement of guaranteed rights, it
chose to analogize the uniformed police personnel to the military7 and refused to overturn the regulation reasoning that such
a decision was "better left to the officials who [were] aware
of the local customs and taboos."'
The respondent/patrolmen appealed; the court of appeals
reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case
for further adjudication.' Unconvinced by the lower court's
"para-military" rationale, the court reasoned that "the
police
force [remained] significantly different in character from the
military," thereby implying that patrolmen are entitled to
skin surface of the face.
2/75.5 WIGS: Wigs or hair pieces will not be worn on duty in uniform
except for cosmetic reasons to cover natural baldness or physical disfiguration. If under these conditions, a wig or hair piece is worn it will conform
to department standards.
Dwen v. Barry, 336 F. Supp. 487, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
4. Dwen v. Barry, 336 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
5. See Order No. 71-1, supra note 3.
6. Dwen v. Barry, 336 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
7. 336 F. Supp. at 488. Although the district court accepted the "para-military"
rationale for justification of the regulation in question, the court of appeals pointed
out several significant differences between the police force and the military. It noted,
for example, that the police force was still locally controlled and organized, and subject
to more direct control of the electorate than the military; that although police officials
were given broad discretion in running their departments, dismissal of patrolmen was
subject to court review; and that although discipline was essential for an effective
police force, unquestioning obedience which characterized military discipline was not
necessary for an effective police force. Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1129 (2d Cir.
1973).
8. Dwen v. Barry, 336 F. Supp. at 487-88.
9. The case was remanded to allow the police department an opportunity to
prove a nexus between "its regulation and the legitimate interest it sought to promote." The court of appeals stated that the burden would be on the Commissioner to
establish a genuine public need for the regulation. Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d at 1131.
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greater protection of their personal liberties than are members
of the armed forces.' 0 Holding that the limitations on respondent's due process rights required some showing of genuine
public need, the court remanded the case for a determination
of whether the hair grooming regulations were necessary for the
purpose of maintaining discipline."
On remand," the district court held that "no proof" was
offered to support a genuine public need for the regulation.
While acknowledging that "proper grooming [was] an ingredient of a good police department's esprit de corps," the court
ruled that petitioner's standards did not pass constitutional
scrutiny because they ultimately reduced to "uniformity for
uniformity's sake."'" Following the district court's decision in
favor of the respondent,'4 petitioner's appeal was dismissed
without opinion by the court of appeals.' 5
"To consider the constitutional doctrine embodied in the
rulings of the court of appeals,"'" the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari" even though it had in the past consistently declined to hear cases dealing with hair grooming regulations.'I Holding that the challenged regulation did not violate
10. Id. at 1129.
11. Id. at 1130-31.
12. On remand, the complaint was amended to reflect the interim renumbering
and modification of the hair grooming regulation. Former sections 2/75.0-2/75.3 supra
note 3, were modified as follows:
Members of the Force will be neat and clean at all times while on duty.
Male personnel will comply with the following grooming standards unless
excluded by the Police Commissioner due to special assignments:
A. Hair will be neat, clean, trimmed and present a groomed appearance. Hair will not go below the ears or the collar except the closely cut
hair on the back of the neck. Pony tails are prohibited. In no case will
the bulk or length of the hair interfere with the proper wear of any authorized headgear.
B. If a member chooses to wear sideburns, they will be neatly trimmed.
Sideburns will not extend below the lowest part of the ear. Sideburns
shall not be flared beyond 2" in width and will end with a clean-shaven
horizontal line. Sideburns shall not connect with the mustache.
C. A neatly trimmed mustache may be worn.
The remaining sections, 2/75.4-2/75.5, see note 3 supra, were simply renumbered
as 2/2.16, subdivisions D and E, respectively. Although the changes in the above three
sections evidenced a slight liberalization of the standards, the differences were irrelevant for the purposes of this decision. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 242 n.4 (1976).
13. Id. at 242-43 (the district court's hearing on remand is unreported).
14. Id. at 243-44.
15. Dwen v. Barry, 508 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1975).
16. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 239 (1976).
17. 421 U.S. 987 (1975).
18. According to one commentator, "[Ilt may be significant that shortly before
granting certiorari to Dwen, the Court declined to hear two cases in which state courts
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the due process rights guaranteed to the respondent by the
fourteenth amendment,' 9 the Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling and reinstated the district court's initial holding
dismissing the action.
On examination, the majority of the Court appears to have
based its decision on two premises. First, the Court distinguished federal and state employees who may be subjected to
comprehensive and substantial restrictions upon their activities from the citizenry at large, whose freedoms may not be so
substantially curtailed. Second, the Court analogized the
county police department's grooming regulation to a legislative
act and applied a general presumption of validity. ' "
In a discussion of the first premise vis-A-vis the respondent/state employee, the Court distinguished the liberty interest" as affected by the hair grooming regulation from those
liberty interests already dealt with by the Court (including
procreation, marriage and family life)." Although noting its
lack of precedent concerning fourteenth amendment claims to
matters of personal appearance, the Court briefly stated that
had upheld similar regulations." The author found the following cases to support his
contention: Akridge v. Barres, 65 N.J. 266, 321 A.2d 230 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
966 (1975); Jackson v. New York City Transit Auth., 33 N.Y.2d 958, 309 N.E.2d 132,
353 N.Y.S.2d 732, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974). Comment, Long Hairand the Law,
supra note 2.
19. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 249 (1976). Although respondent's complaint had challenged the regulation by use of first amendment freedom of expression
and fourteenth amendment equal protection arguments as well as due process grounds,
the court of appeals found sufficient support for its decision under the due process
clause. For this reason, the Supreme Court confined its holding to the due process
claim.
20. 425 U.S. at 247.
21. The term "liberty interest" is derived from section one of the fourteenth
amendment which provides in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " (emphasis added).
As the Kelley Court noted, "This section affords not only a procedural guarantee
against the deprivation of 'liberty' but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty
against unconstitutional restriction by the State." 425 U.S. at 244. See, e.g., Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student's interest in the damage to his reputation caused
by suspension from school); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (interest of citizens in travelling abroad); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(interest of parents in being able to send their children to private as well as public
schools).
22. 425 U.S. at 244, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's right to
abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (unmarried individual's right to
contraceptives and information pertaining thereto); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (right of unwed father to the custody of his children); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married person's right to family planning information and contraceptives); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (citizen's right to learn a foreign
language).
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this particular liberty interest probably exists, but that the
determination of this issue was in no way crucial to the decision
in this case.23 Its reasoning for this "immateriality" was based
primarily on the respondent/patrolmen's status as a state employee rather than as a member of the citizenry at large.24
The Court reasoned that as a member of the police force,
respondent had "duties which [had] no counterpart with respect to the public at large," and that the hair grooming regulation was just one of the "myriad" of demands placed upon
him. 5 The Court saw the county's choice of a standard for
personal appearance as part of its chosen mode of organization,
and as one which "necessarily [gave] weight to the overall
need for discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity." 26
That such regulations would promote the above-stated
purposes is a contention worthy of closer scrutiny. Mr. Justice
Marshall, speaking for the minority, argued that he could find
no rational relationship between the challenged regulation and
its goals.27
Initially, Justice Marshall had no difficulty in finding a
constitutional basis for a right to govern one's personal appearance; he reasoned that such a right was so clear that it has
always been taken for granted.2" In addition, he stated that a
policeman does not surrender his right in his personal appearance simply by joining the police force."
"While fully accepting the aims of 'identifiability' and
maintenance of esprit de corps," Justice Marshall could find
no rational relationship between the challenged regulation and
23. 425 U.S. at 244 (1976). The dissent, however, found the determination regarding the right to choose one's personal appearance to be one of the crucial points
in the case. Id. at 250-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24. 425 U.S. at 245.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 246.
27. Id. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. With regard to the individual's right to govern his appearance, Mr. Justice
Marshall stated:
If little can be found in past cases of this Court or indeed in the Nation's
history on the specific issue of a citizen's right to choose his personal
appearance, it is only because the right has been so clear as to be beyond
question. When the right has been mentioned, its existence has simply
been taken for granted.
Id. at 251.
29. Id. at 254 n.5. Justice Marshall stated: "To hold that citizens somehow
automatically give up constitutional rights by becoming public employees would mean
that almost 15 million American citizens are currently affected by having 'executed'
such 'automatic waivers.' "
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these goals20 As to the "identifiability" justification, he contended that it would be erroneous to assume that the public
would automatically associate short hair with policemen; in
addition, he reasoned that the use of uniforms would be a more
logical and less intrusive means of achieving the goal of identifiability.3
In light of the minority's persuasive opinion, it also seems
quite debatable whether the regulation in question could contribute to a more heightened esprit de corps. As Justice Marshall astutely pointed out, the fact that it was the President of
the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, in his Official
Capacity, who had initiated the suit, would seem to indicate
that the regulation would, if anything, decrease, rather than
increase the police force's esprit de corps.32
The apparent rationale33 for the majority's decision must
therefore be based strongly on the Court's second premisethat is, that the regulation should not be viewed in isolation,
but as part of the county's chosen mode of organization for its
police force.34 The Court perceived the regulation to be the result of chosen policy, analogous to other state choices designed
to advance various aims within the jurisdiction of the state's
police power. Applying this premise, the majority reasoned
that the order fixing hair length standards was entitled to some
presumption of legislative validity. 5
The Court then pointed to several of its own decisions in
which it accorded the government wide latitude in the dispatch
30. Id. at 254.
31. Id. at 255 n.7.
32. Id. Bolstering Justice Marshall's contention that the regulation in question
would decrease rather than increase esprit de corps was the fact that the 25,000 member International Brotherhood of Police Officers filed an amicus brief arguing that the
challenged regulation was unconstitutional. Id. at 255 n.6.
33. It may indeed be questioned just how much "rationale" the Court needs to
justify its decision in hair regulation cases. As one writer thoughtfully noted:
The difficulty with the substantive due process approach to grooming
regulations is the ease with which it can be molded to fit a court's determination of what the result should be. If a court wished to strike down
even a reasonable hair regulation, it would need only to find that the
plaintiff's interest in maintaining his hirsute appearance was so fundamental as to come under the aegis of the compelling interest test. Alternatively, if a court had a distaste for long hair on males, it could declare
the infringement to be a relatively minor one and require only a rational
basis for the regulations.
Comment, Long Hair and the Law, supra note 2, at 149 (emphasis added).
34. 425 U.S. at 247.
35. Id.
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of its own affairs." Against this background, the majority
rejected the court of appeals' test calling for the state to satisfy
its duty to establish a "genuine public need ' 37 in favor of its
own test: "whether respondent can demonstrate that there is
no rational connection between the regulation, based as it is on
respondent's method of organizing its police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property. '3 The Court now had
before it a test by which it could determine whether the en-.
acted regulation was "rational" or "arbitrary" and whether the
state's interest was sufficiently genuine to prevail over the individual's. 3 9 Viewing the substance of the regulation to be a policy decision, the Court noted the well-established judicial policy not to over-extend its power by passing judgment on "legis40
lative enactments.1
The Kelley decision appears to be quite consistent with the
present Court's deference to governmental regulations, usually
requiring that a statute be clearly "arbitrary" before the Court
will rule in favor of the individual. Although Justice Powell
mentioned in his concurring opinion that the individual's liberty interest was outweighed by the need for the regulation,"
36. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961) (Navy's
authority to exclude private employee from premises); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (state's desire to safeguard the right of suffrage is a
permissible intrusion into the business-labor field); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (state statute prohibiting minors from selling merchandise on the streets is
permissible exercise of state's police power); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941)
(state may limit amount of fee which may be charged by a private employment
agency).
37. Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1973).
38. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. at 247.
39. Id. See Comment, Long Hair and the Law, supra note 2, at 149, where the
author suggests that the applicable test should be: "Unless the government can show
that restrictive grooming regulations bear a reasonable relationship . . .to efficient
job performance, it should be constitutionally barred from . . . dismissing an employee for refusal to comply with such regulations."
40. In support of its determination that the regulation was rational and valid,
the Court, with approval, referred to Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955), in which it stated: "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought." Id. at 488.
41. Mr. Justice Powell stated:
When the State has an interest in regulating one's personal appearance,
as it certainly does in this case, there must be a weighing of the degree
of infringement of the individual's liberty interest against the need for the
regulation. This process of analysis justifies the application of a reasonable regulation to a uniformed police force that would be an impermissible
intrusion upon liberty in a different context.
425 U.S. at 249 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the Court itself seems to have spent a disproportionate amount
of its discussion considering the municipality's purpose in enacting the regulation. The majority took only cursory notice of
the other side of the traditional balancing test,42 the degree of
infringement on the respondent's constitutionally protected
right to "reflect, sustain and nourish his personality."4 3
Kelley v. Johnson is significant in that the Court appears
to have put an end to at least part of the hair-length regulation
dilemma, a controversy which has taken up much judicial time
in recent years and has yielded vague and inconsistent results."
Under its narrowest reading, Kelley indicates that members of
a uniformed police force will meet with defeat if they decide to
challenge a hair grooming regulation on due process grounds,
and, as suggested by the Court's dicta, on first amendment
grounds as well.4" Grooming standards have been successfully
42. The traditional balancing test, used in both due process and equal protection
cases, usually involves weighing the government's legitimate interest in furthering the
promulgated legislation against the infringement on the individual's constitutionally
protected right. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
43. 425 U.S. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. The inconsistency of both reasoning and outcome in dealing with hair length
regulations is evidenced at both the federal and state levels.
Concerning school grooming codes, for example, several circuits have refused to
uphold these regulations. See, e.g., Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972);
Massie v. Henry, 445 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th
Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d
1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
Contra, Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972);
Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972); King
v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979
(1971); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
Further, the Third Circuit has shifted its position: compare Stull v. School Bd., 459
F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972) with Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600
(3d Cir. 1975) (plurality opinion). See Comment, Long Hair and the Law, supra note
2, at 156, n.ll0.
State courts have also reached anomalous results. In New York, for example, one
court struck down a grooming regulation for firemen, whereas other courts have sustained the validity of such regulations. Compare Hunt v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 68
Misc. 2d 261, 327 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1971) with Olszewski v. Council of Hempstead Fire
Dep't, 70 Misc. 603, 334 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct. 1972) and Austin v. Howard, 39 App.
Div. 2d 76, 332 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972).
45. With respect to the claims that the regulation infringed upon the respondent's rights under the first amendment, the Court referred to several of its prior
decisions in which it "sustained comprehensive and substantial restrictions upon the
activities of both federal and state employees lying at the core of the First Amendment." 425 U.S. at 245. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Civil Service
Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). These were Hatch Act cases upholding
the governmental interest in restricting the political activities of federal employees.
In light of this and in consideration of both the nature of the "interest" involved
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challenged on other grounds,4" but it is difficult to determine
just how these challenges would fair in light of Kelley. It seems
clear, however, that the present Court will display some degree
of deference to any regulation promulgated by another branch
of the government.
Another arguably limiting factor to be considered in applying Kelley to future challenges of grooming regulations, is the
specific emphasis given by the majority to respondent's status
as a member of a state-employed uniformed police force.47
Whether other types of public employees, such as school teachers, 6 will be barred from successfully challenging these standards through use of a similar public employee rationale also
remains an open question for future courts to adjudicate. It is
apparent, however, that the Supreme Court has, at least so far
as policemen are concerned, finally provided a norm for other
courts to apply when confronted with regulations restricting
the individual's choice of personal appearance.
Lauren Easman-Taal
and the status of respondent as a state employee, the Kelley Court stated: "If such
state regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of the First
Amendment, there is surely even more room for restrictive regulations of state employees where the claim implicates only the more general contours of the substantive
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 425 U.S. at 245.
46. In addition to first amendment "symbolic speech" and fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection grounds, grooming regulations have been challenged under the ninth amendment, right of privacy, and title VII (claims based on
sex discrimination). See, e.g., Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th
Cir. 1974) (title VII); Stull v. School Bd., 450 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972) (due process);
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971) (ninth amendment); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971)
(symbolic spech); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) (equal protection);
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970) (privacy).
See Comment, Long Hair and the Law, supra note 2.
47. Arguably, firemen can also be analogized as a para-military organ. In fact,
fire department regulations have in the past been easier to support than police grooming regulations because of the dangerous nature of the job. A possible justification was
cited in Michini v. Rizzo, 379 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Pa. 1974), where the court stated
that unlike the police, firemen work as a team and therefore military organization may
be justified. See Comment, Long Hair and the Law, supra note 2 at 158.
48. Though the "para-military" rationale is inapplicable to school teachers, this
group's challenges have not often ended in success. See, e.g., Miller v. School Dist. 167,
495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974). Contra Lansdale v. Tyler Jr. College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th
Cir. 1970). Similarly, students have been for the most part unsuccessful in overturning
regulations governing personal appearance. The Ninth Circuit has upheld such regulations in California. See, e.g., King v. Saddleback Jr. College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972); Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist.,
445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1042 (1972).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-COASTAL COMMISSION'S
FAILURE TO CONSIDER EFFECT OF FINAL BUILDOUT
OF SUBDIVISION WHEN ALLOWING ISSUANCE OF
DEVELOPMENT PERMITS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION-Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission,
55 Cal. App. 3d 397, 129 Cal. Rptr. 57, aff'd on rehearing, 57
Cal. App. 3d 76 (1976).
Fifteen lot owners in a subdivision called Sea Ranch,' purchased their property prior to apprval of the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Act (Act)2 and obtained permission to build
1. Sea Ranch is located on the coast in northern Sonoma County. Its northern
boundary is the Gualala River, from which it extends south about 10 miles along the
shoreline. The subdivision touches on approximately one percent of California's ocean
beaches. Originally it was intended that these beaches be available only to Sea Ranch
owners. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, 55 Cal. App. 3d 397, 407, 129 Cal. Rptr. 57, 62, aff'd on rehearing,
57 Cal. App. 3d 76, 86 (1976). See note 13 infra.
2. The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act, commonly known as Proposition 20, was an initiative measure passed by the state's electorate in 1972. The stated
policy of the Act was the preservation, protection, and restoration of natural resources
in the California coastal zone. It is now codified at CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27001 (West
Supp. 1976).
In order to implement this policy, the Act created the California Coastal Zone
Conservation Commission (Commission) and six regional commissions. Id. §§ 27200,
27201. The Act assigned to the Commission the task of preparing the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Plan (Plan) and directed that such Plan be submitted to the legislature by December 1, 1975. Id. §§ 27001(b), 27300. The Plan was to be both comprehensive and enforceable, and was intended to guide the long-range management of coastal
resources. Id. § 27001(b). More specifically, the Act required that the Plan conform to
certain delineated objectives:
(a) The maintenance, restoration, and enhancement of the overall
quality of the coastal zone environment, including, but not limited to, the
amenities and aesthetic values.
(b) The continued existence of optimum populations of all species
of living organisms.
(c) The orderly, balanced utilization and preservation, consistent
with sound conservation principles, of all living and nonliving coastal
zone resources.
(d) Avoidance of irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
coastal zone resources.
Id. § 27302.
Pending adoption of the Plan by the legislature, the Act authorized the Commission and the regional commissions to control the issuance of development permits in
the coastal zone. Id. § 27400. Such permits were to be granted only upon a finding by
the regional commission. "(a) That the development will not have any substantial
adverse environmental or ecological effect; and (b) That the development is consistent
with the findings and declarations set forth in Section 27001 and with the objectives
set forth in Section 27302." Id. § 27402.
The Act provided for appeal to the Commission from a decision by a regional
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from the appropriate Sonoma County authorities. After the Act
came into effect, they applied to the proper California coastal
zone regional commission for development permits, which were
granted.3
Appellants, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(NRDC), and California Coastal Reliance, Inc., appealed the
regional commission's decision to the California Coastal Zone
Commission (Commission), pursuant to California Public Resources Code section 27423.' Evidence presented at the Commission hearing was to the effect that, even though the fifteen
permits at issue would have no significant environmental impact, the Sea Ranch development, at full buildout,5 would pose
a serious environmental threat. Specifically, the evidence indicated that reliance on septic tanks for sewage disposal would
"invite trouble" in a subdivision of this size; that man-induced
rainwater and septic tank runoff would cause erosion and cliff
retreat; that the projected development at Sea Ranch would
ultimately cause severe traffic problems on Highway 1;1 and
that fishlife and water flow would be jeopardized by the divercommission (id. § 27423), and judicial review of Commission rulings was also made
available:
Any person, including an applicant for a permit, aggrieved by the
decision or action of the commission or regional commission shall have a
right to judicial review of such decision or action by filing a petition for
a writ of mandate in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 2, (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, within 60 days after such decision or action has become final.
Id. § 27424.
3. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 405, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
4. The Act's provision for appeal of a regional commission decision states that:
(a) An applicant, or any person aggrieved by approval of a permit
by the regional commission, may appeal to the commission.
(b) The commission may affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of
the regional commission. If the commission fails to act within 60 days
after notice of appeal has been filed, the regional commission's decision
shall become final.
(c) The commission may decline to hear appeals that it determines
raise no substantial issues. Appeals it hears shall be scheduled for a de
novo public hearing and shall be decided in the same manner and by the
same vote as provided for decisions by the regional commissions.
CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27423 (West Supp. 1976).
A "person aggrieved" has been held to be a resident or citizen of the state or a
person who has a financial or proprietary interest in the regional commission's decision. See Klitgaard & Jones, Inc. v. San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n, 48 Cal. App.
3d 99, 121 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1975).
5. See note 13 infra.
6. Highway 1 is a winding, two-lane rural road which serves as the only means
of access to Sea Ranch. The subdivision straddles the highway, but with most of the
lots to seaward. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 407, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
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sion of water from wells near the Gualala River. In spite of this
evidence, the Commission, after holding a public hearing and
adopting both a written report and a statement of findings and
decisions, ordered that the permits be granted.' Thereupon
appellants filed a petition for a writ of mandates to compel the
Commission to reverse its decision. The trial court denied the
petition and appellants perfected their appeal.'
7. Id. at 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
8. Review of agency acts purportedly in excess of jurisdiction is properly sought
under CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1976). "Traditional mandamus,"
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1955), can only be granted where the action reviewed is purely ministerial and will not lie where the agency action involved is discretionary. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court (Veta Co.), 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281,
115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974).
9. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 409, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 63. At the time of the trial court
proceedings, another action involving the same parties was being heard in federal
district court. That case, Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Comm'n, 396 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1975), dealt with the constitutional aspects of
the controversy. The Sea Ranch Association, a non-profit organization which held large
tracts of common land in the Sea Ranch Development and 11 of the 15 landowners
who were the real parties in interest in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
on the theory that constitutional concepts of vested rights and due process precluded
application of the Act to the contested permits. Plaintiffs' permits had been granted,
but subject to stringent conditions. Their argument was that the narrow definition of
vested rights under the Act ignored certain property rights which had vested before
the Act took effect. The Commission, the regional commissions, individual commission
members, NRDC, California Coastal Alliance and the Sierra Club were joined as
defendants. The district court discussed the concept of vested rights under the Act as
interpreted in recent state cases and determined that the crucial section, 27404, was
subject to various interpretations. Consequently, the district court chose to abstain
until section 27404 should be definitively interpreted, either in Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Coinm 'n or in some
other case. The district court nevertheless retained jurisdiction over those questions
not resolved in the state court, and reserved all constitutional issues for resolution in
federal court. Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 396
F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
Plaintiffs appealed to the circuit court of appeal. The circuit court upheld the
lower court's abstention on the grounds that although the record did not disclose
whether the claim of vested rights was to apply to the entire development or just to
the individual permits, neither argument could prevail. First, the court observed, the
question of vested rights in regard to the entire Sea Ranch development was at issue
in a state court proceeding brought by Oceanic California, the Sea Ranch developer.
A constitutional interpretation of the Act's vested rights provisions in that case, the
court reasoned, would moot the question of exemption for the entire project. Secondly,
the vested rights exemption was disallowed as to the individual lots on a finding of no
case or controversy since appellants failed to show facts which would entitle any
particular lot to such exemption. Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 537 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1976).
Whether the entire Sea Ranch project or any of the individual lots is exempt from
the Act's permit requirements has yet to be resolved. The case brought by Oceanic
California has not been decided, and the court in Natural Resources Defense Council,

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the Commission's determination that the permits at issue would have no
substantial adverse environmental or ecological effects was
supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record."
This conclusion stemmed directly from the court's affirmative
response to the question of whether the Commission properly
disregarded the effects of full buildout at Sea Ranch in deciding to allow the contested permits. It was this basic conclusion,
that an evaluation of environmental effect is to be limited to
the probable consequences of granting the permits at issue,
which directed the court's analysis of the case and determined
the result.
Appellants did not object principally to the issuance of the
fifteen contested permits." Instead, they argued that those permits would act as a "foot in the door" which would open the
way to more permits, further development and "eventual environmental disaster" at Sea Ranch." Specific objections to
Commission proceedings were therefore couched in terms of
"projected development," "full buildout" and "potential impact."13
The court of appeal rejected this approach:
[O]ur inquiry, on this appeal, extends no further than the
determination whether the Commission could reasonably
find that construction of the 15 permitted homes would
"not have any substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect," and was "consistent with the findings and
declarations set forth in Section 27001 and with the objectives set forth in Section 27302."
The court reasoned that the Commission's authority to grant
permits was merely an interim power, effective only until the
adoption of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Plan
(Plan),' and that the scope of the Commission's discretion
Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n did not reach the vested rights
question.
10. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 411, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 64-65.
11. Id. at 409, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 64.

12. Id.
13.

The 15 permits granted by the Commission will increase the number of

houses at Sea Ranch from 340 to 355. The original development was planned for 5,200
houses but that number may be reduced to 4,000. Upon full buildout, Sea Ranch would
be the largest community on the Pacific Coast between San Francisco and Eureka. 55
Cal. App. 3d 397, 129 Cal. Rptr. 57.
14. Id. at 411, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 64 (emphasis in original).
15. See note 2 supra.
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therefore extended only to a decision on the acceptability of the
permits at issue." The thrust of this logic seems to be that any
long-range determinations fall strictly within the purpose and
framework of the Plan and cannot be made until it is enacted. 7
The court's basic response to the arguments presented by
appellants in support of their petition for a writ of mandate was
predetermined by its initial decision that only the effects of the
fifteen contested permits should be considered. The arguments, as framed by appellants, were that
[1] the Commission refused to adhere to procedures designed to elicit full disclosure and consideration of the environmental consequences of its decision and [2] the reasons for that decision. It ignored its responsibility to prepare written findings in support of its decision in the manner required by law, and [31 it refused to prepare and
consider an environmental impact report on further development at the Sea Ranch as required by the California
Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code §§
21000 et seq. [4] Another contention is that the conditions
16. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 410, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
17. It is not clear why the court felt constrained to view the question before it so
narrowly. Acting Presiding Judge Sims, in his dissenting opinion, recognized that the
issue was really much broader:
The fundamental question here is whether the Commission has properly disregarded the consequences which will result from the total population to be sustained if the subdivision of which applicants' lots are a
part is fully built out. It seems to me that at some point a beginning must
be made to avoid what appears to be the inevitable conflict between the
results of that buildout and the environmental purposes and objectives
set forth in the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972. It
would appear preferable to make that beginning at this time. I reluctantly acknowledge that the interim nature of the permit power prevents
a permanent solution with these applications.
Id. at 417, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
The Act itself does not limit the Commission to consideration of the permits at
issue. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27400 et seq. (West Supp. 1976). Rather, the purpose and
objectives of the Act suggest a forward-looking approach designed to ensure that the
ecology of the California coastline will be carefully protected both now and in the
future. Id. §§ 27001, 27302, 27402; see note 2 supra. One commentator has observed
that:
As has been amplified by numerous decisions dealing with temporary
suspension of construction pending preparation of long-range planning
schemes, allowance of unfettered development before planning is completed may severely restrict future options. The California Act, in sections 27001(c) and 27402(b) recognizes this by providing that development which conflicts with the objectives of the ultimate plan should not
be allowed in the interim period.
Some Recent Developments in Coastal Protection, 4 E.L.R. 10138, 10140 (1974); see
notes 44, 48 infra.
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imposed upon the granting of the permits were inadequate
and otherwise invalid."8

After an initial determination that Commission action on
a permit application is quasi-judicial rather than quasilegislative,"° the court considered appellants' contention that
the Commission failed to adhere to procedures designed to
elicit full disclosure and consideration of the environmental
consequences of its decision. Appellants maintained that the
Commission should have investigated and evaluated the consequences of the subdivision's final buildout, 0 and should have
granted the permits only if the evidence showed that the subdivision itself would have no substantial adverse environmental
or ecological effect and was otherwise consistent with the findings, declarations and objectives of the Act. Instead, the court
found that "there was evidence, and there were reasonable inferences derivable from that evidence, that the adverse environmental impact of the development contemplated by the 15
permits at issue would be minimal."'" Consequently, the Commission's decision to grant the requested permits reflected no
abuse of discretion, and appellants' argument that the Commission refused to adhere to procedures designed to elicit full
disclosure and consideration of the environmental consequences of its decision was without merit.22
Next, the court considered the contention that the Commission failed to prepare written findings in support of its decision to grant the fifteen permits.2 3 Again appellants argued that
such findings would have to show that Sea Ranch at full buildout would "not have any substantial adverse environmental
or ecological effect."'" The court determined that the proper
18. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 409, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 63-64.
19. Id. at 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62. The respondent Commission had argued
that its function in regard to permits was quasi-legislative, and that its decisions
should be upheld unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or totally lacking in evidentiary support. The quasi-judicial standard requires that Commission decisions be supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. Application of the stricter
standard was not determinative in this case, and the court briefly based its decision
in that regard on the fact that the applicable enabling statute delegated a function
which was "essentially judicial."
The same decision was reached on identical facts in Davis v. California Coastal
Zone Conservation Comm'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 700, 129 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
20. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 410, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
21. Id. at 411, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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criteria for such findings are that they be adequate to "bridge
the analytic gap between the raw evidence and the ultimate
decision or order,"2 and that they "record the grounds upon
which a judgment or other decision rests, thus to render its
legality reasonably, and conveniently, reviewable on appeal. ' '2 ,
The court briefly summarized the Commission's findings as a
determination that, although full buildout at Sea Ranch might
pose a serious environmental threat, the granting of the fifteen
permits would not." These findings, in the court's opinion,
were properly determined by the superior court to be legally
adequate since they made sufficiently clear to the reviewing
court the reasoning process of the Commission. 28
The third argument made by appellants concerned the
failure of the Commission to prepare and consider an environmental impact report as required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).29 The court rejected the contention that such failure invalidated the fifteen permits. In the
court's opinion, the Commission's exhaustive staff report was,
in essence, an environmental impact report.30 This opinion was
based on findings that the report was an informational document which met the requirements of Public Resources Code
section 21061, 3' and that its content conformed to that of an
impact report under Public Resources Code section 21100.32
25. Id. at 412, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 65, quoting Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974).
26. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 413, 129 Cal. Rptr at 66. In support of its position the court
cited McKinnon v. McKinnon, 181 Cal. App. 2d 97, 5 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1960); Taliaferro
v. Taliaferro, 178 Cal. App. 2d 146, 2 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1960).
27. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 413, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
28. Id.
29. CEQA reads, in relevant part: "All state agencies, boards and commissions
shall prepare, or cause to be prepared by contract, and certify the completion of an
environmental impact report on any project they propose to carry out or approve which
may have a significant effect on the environment." CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West
Supp. 1976).
30. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 413, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
31. Id. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 21061 (West Supp. 1976) provides:
An environmental impact report is an informational document
which, when its preparation is required by this division, shall be considered by every public agency prior to its approval or disapproval of a
project. The purpose of an environmental impact report is to provide
public agencies with detailed information about the effect which a proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which
any adverse effects of such a project might be minimized; and to suggest
alternatives to such a project.
32. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 413, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 66. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 21100
(West Supp. 1976) requires that an environmental impact report include the following
information:
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The court further stated that the substance rather than the
form of such a report was significant.33
Further, the court held that the Commission need not file
an impact report because it was an agency whose purpose was
not only the drafting of a plan for the protection of the environment, but also, pending the completion of such plan, the actual
protection of the environment.34 In support of its position, the
court cited a number of federal decisions involving the Environmental Protection Agency which held that to require the
EPA, whose raison d'etre is the protection of the environment,
to file an impact report in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) would be redundant and "a legalism carried to the extreme."35 The court noted that NEPA
and CEQA were nearly identical and observed that the rationale used in the federal cases should also excuse the Commission
from any obligation to file an environmental impact report in
compliance with CEQA regulations.3"
(a) The environmental impact of the proposed action.
(b) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if
the proposal is implemented.
(c) Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the impact including, but not limited to, measures to reduce wasteful, inefficient, and
unnecessary consumption of energy.
(d) Alternatives to the proposed action.
(e) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.
(f) Any irreversible environmental changes which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
(g) The growth-inducing impact of the proposed action.
33. The court cited CAL. CiV. CODE § 3528 (West 1970), which reads, "The law
respects form less than substance;" and Kennard v. Rosenberg, 127 Cal. App. 2d 340,
273 P.2d 839 (1954), in support of this rule. Kennard, however, deals with statutory
construction and makes no mention of informational documents such as environmental
impact reports.
34. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 414. (This portion of the opinion was not included in the
unofficial report.)
35. Id. at 414, citing Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir.
1973); Duquesne Light Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
36. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 67. In support of this conclusion
the court quoted the following dicta:
The federal act became law on January 1, 1970, just a bit short of a year
before that of California. The two statutes are so parallel in content and
so nearly identical in words that judicial interpretation of the federal law
is strongly persuasive in our deciding the meaning of our state statute.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside Co. Water Dist., 27 Cal. App. 3d 695,
701, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197, 200 (1972).
"The resemblance between NEPA and CEQA is so uncanny that the conclusion
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Additionally, an environmental impact report was not required for the fifteen permits at Sea Ranch because CEQA
demands an impact report only on a project "which may have
a significant effect on the environment." 37 Because the Commission cannot issue a permit until it has found that the proposed development will not have a substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect, the court reasoned that CEQA's
impact report provisions were inapplicable to a permit action.3 8
The validity of this argument depends again on the court's
original conclusion that only the effects of granting the fifteen
contested permits should be taken into account. The record of
the Commission's hearing indicates that full buildout at Sea
Ranch might well have serious environmental consequences. 9
If this projected development were taken into account, the proposed project would be one "which may have a significant effect on the environment," and would therefore fall within that
class of developments for which CEQA requires an impact report.
Finally, the court dispensed with appellants' contention
that the fifteen permits were invalid because the conditions
attached to them were inadequate to comply with the standards set forth in section 27403 of the Act."0 The conditions
imposed on the fifteen permits issued by the Commission included establishing programs to monitor the cumulative effects
is inescapable that CEQA was deliberately modelled after NEPA. Therefore the same

consideration ought to govern the applicability of both statutes ...

"

Keith v. Volpe,

352 F. Supp. 1324, 1337 (C.D. 1972).
37. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 67, quoting CAL. PUB. RaE. CODE §
21100 (West Supp. 1976).
38. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
39. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
40. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 67. CAL. PUa. RPs. CODE: § 27403
(West Supp. 1976) reads:
All permits shall be subject to reasonable terms and conditions in
order to ensure:
(a) Access to publicly owned or used beaches, recreation areas, and
natural reserves is increased to the maximum extent possible by appropriate dedication.
(b) Adequate and properly located public recreation areas and
wildlife preserves are reserved.
(c) Provisions are made for solid and liquid waste treatment, disposition, and management which will minimize adverse effects upon coastal
zone resources.
(d) Alteration to existing land forms and vegetation, and construction of structures shall cause minimum adverse effects to scenic resources
and minimum danger of floods, landslides, erosion, siltation, or failure in
the event of earthquake.
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of septic tanks, to thin and trim trees planted to the west of
Highway 1 which interfered with ocean views, to monitor the
effects of Sea Ranch water diversions on the fish life in the
Gualala River, and to introduce systems of limited public access to the Sea Ranch coastline through the issuance of permits
or passes." The court briefly found these conditions to be reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise responsive to the Commission's duty under section 27403.2
The court, in summation, concluded that the Commission
proceedings at issue "were conducted in accordance with law,
and otherwise without error or abuse of discretion under the
standards of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivi' This conclusion
sion (b)."1
ostensibly rests upon separate findings that the Commission adhered to procedures designed to
elicit full disclosure and consideration of the effects of the proposed development, that its written findings adequately supported its decision to allow the contested permits, that the
Commission was not required to file an environmental impact
report, and that the conditions attached to the permits were
adequate and valid. However, the court's decision that the
Commission properly disregarded the effects of full build-out
at Sea Ranch underlies most of these findings and stands as the
most significant aspect of the case."

41. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 409, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
42. Id. at 415, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
43. Id. at 416, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
44. Those authorities who have commented on permit procedures under the Act
generally assign to the Commission a "watchdog" role not reflected in the proceedings
reviewed in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n. In reference to the granting of the Sea Ranch permits, an article
in the Environmental Law Institute's Environmental Law Reporter notes that:
These provisions (sections 27402 and 27001), coupled with the fact
that the California Act was mandated by the voters of the state as an
initiative measure, make it particularly ironic that the California Commission has not shown itself in this case to be an aggressive protector of
the coastline.
4 E.L.R. 10138, 10141 (1974).
A similar comment on the permit process in general is found in Jackson & Baum,
Regional Planning: The Coastal Zone Initiative Analyzed in Light of the BCDC
Experience, 47 CAL. ST. BAR J. 426 (1972): "[11f the proposed project in any way
prematurely fixes and establishes a land use or an element the Regional Commission
will, in all likelihood, deny the permit." Id. at 490. Another comparison with BCDC
reaches the same conclusion:
Drawing upon the experience of the San Francisco Bay Conservation
and Development Commission, the most sensible approach would appear
to be the granting of such permits as are not in conflict with the spirit
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Since the decision in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, the
state legislature has passed the California Coastal Act of 1976.11
The 1976 Act, like that of 1972, provides general guidelines for
development in the coastal zone." The new Act more specifically delineates the factors to be considered in analyzing the
desirability of proposed development than did the 1972 Act, 7
but even the new criteria are not strict. Beyond providing that
no development which would interfere with the ability of a
local government to formulate a local coastal program shall be
allowed, the 1976 Act does not reveal any legislative attitude
and objectives of the act, and the denial of permits where there is any
doubt in the matter. Since limited coastal resources may be irretrievably
lost, or delicate ecological systems irreparably damaged, it is clearly in
the public interest to err on the side of caution.
Romero & Schenkel, Saving the Seashore: Management Planningfor the Coastal Zone,

25 HASTINGS L.J. 191, 199 (1973).
It has even been suggested that a total moratorium on development pending the
adoption of the Plan would be neither unreasonable nor illegal:
If the statewide commission, pursuant to its powers under section
27420(a) directs the regional commissions to assess their regulatory responsibilities in terms of the strongest public policy positions declared in
the initiative preamble there would be an effective moratorium on all
developments.
Reasonable moratoria pending study and adoptiong of a plan or zoning ordinance have long been held a valid exercise of the police power.
Jackson & Baum, supra, at 489; see Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477,
234 P. 381 (1925); Ogo Assocs. v. City of Torrance, 37 Cal. App. 3d 830, 112 Cal. Rptr.
761 (1974).
45. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1330, § 30000 et seq., at 5773. This new Act
represents the legislature's enactment of the Plan as submitted by the Commission
pursuant to Public Resources Code section 27300.
46. The general standards of the 1976 Act, by which the adequacy of local programs and the permissibility of proposed developments are to be assessed, include
guidelines for providing public access to beach areas (1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1330,
§§ 30210-13), encouraging recreational use of the coastal zone (id. §§ 30220-24), protecting the marine environment (id. §§ 30230-36), preserving land resources (id. §§
30240-44), and controlling development (id. §§ 30250-55).
47. Id. § 30250, at 5784. Section 30250 requires that, except as otherwise provided, new development:
[Sihall be located within, contiguous with, or in close proximity to,
existing developed areas able to accomodate it or, where such areas are
not able to accommodate it, in other areas with adequate public services
and where it will not have significant adverse effects either individually
or cumulatively on coastal resources. ...
The inclusion of the phrase "individually or cumulatively" suggests that the legislature is aware of the increasing adverse effects of more and more development. However, there is a difference between cumulative effects and the potential effects of
ongoing development. The language of the Act does not reach the second of these
considerations.
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toward the question raised in NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission.
That decision, therefore, remains the sole authority on whether
a permit granting body should consider only the effects of the
proposed development before it, or whether it must recognize
the environmental consequences likely to result from full
buildout of a project."
The result reached in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission
would allow the reviewing agency to consider only the possible
conflicts between the proposed individual developments and
the requirements of the Act. Unless local coastal programs resolve this question by requiring evaluation of the effects of an
entire project before any portion of it may be developed,49 at
least two serious problems may arise. First, because building
will be allowed until such time as it begins to have a deleterious
effect upon the environment, piecemeal development will be
encouraged. Second, the various reviewing agencies,50 and
48. There is apparently no case law dealing directly with the question of what
factors, beyond the broad directives of the Act, the Commission must consider before
granting a development permit. There are many cases which discuss permit requirements and procedures under the Act, but they invariably are concerned with vested
rights under section 27404. See, e.g., AVCO Community Developers, Inc. v. South
CoastRegional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976); State
v. Superior Court (Veta Co.), 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974);
San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal. 3d 888, 513 P.2d 129,
109 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973); Environmental Coalition of Orange Co., Inc. v. AVCO
Community Developers, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 513, 115 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1974); Central
Coast Regional Comm'n v. McKeon Construction Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 154, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 903 (1974). Those cases which do touch on the subject suggest a less limited
approach than that taken by the court of appeal. The court in State v. Superior Court
(Veta Co.), 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974), for example, stated
that, "the requirement for a permit is an interim measure to assure that developments
in the coastal zone are consistent with the objectives of the Act so that priceless coastal
resources are not irreversibly committed to uses which would be inconsistent with the
plan ultimately developed." Id. at 253, 524 P.2d at 1292, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 508; see
CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118
Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974).
49. The 1976 Act differs from the 1972 Act in that it provides for formulation of
local development programs with the local government serving as the initial reviewing
body on permit applications. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1330, §§ 30500-22, at 5797. The
exact nature of these local programs has yet to be determined. The Act suggests that
they will be reviewed for conformity with the policies of the Act, and that designated
pilot project areas will provide criteria for evaluating programs subsequently developed. See note 45 supra; 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1330, § 30521, at 5803. The only
strict limitation on such local development programs is that they must provide at least
the degree of environmental protection provided by the plans and policies of any state
regulatory agency.
50. After a local coastal program has been certified, a coastal development per-
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eventually the courts, may be faced with the difficulty of deciding at exactly what point additional development will begin to
have adverse environmental consequences.
Judson Thomas Farley
mit will be obtained from the local government. Id. § 30600(d), at 5804. Prior to
certification, the local government may approve or deny such permits if it first establishes appropriate procedures. Id. § 30600(b), at 5803. Otherwise, permits will be
obtained from the regional commission, or from the Commission on appeal, or from
the Commission where there is no regional commission. Id. § 30600(c), at 5803.

